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RITTER-WISEMAN

DEPARTING FROM THE ORIGINAL GOALS OF THE U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES: DRUG SENTENCING
DISPARITIES IN THE U.S. DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
BY JEREMY RITTER-WISEMAN*
INTRODUCTION
In Fiscal Year 2018, the single most prosecuted type of federal
crime in the United States District of Maryland was drug trafficking.1
Drug trafficking, accounting for 32.3% of all federally prosecuted
crimes in the District of Maryland, was more than double the amount of
the second most prosecuted type of crime, Firearms, which accounted
for only 15.2% of all prosecuted crimes.2 This number is also 5.3 percentage points above the national average for drug trafficking.3 Despite
making up only 41.2% of Maryland’s total population,4 minorities account for 84.3% of all federally prosecuted drug crimes in Maryland
since 2006.5 Although that statistic represents a problematic disparity in
itself, this Comment will instead address a different area of sentencing
disparity: the disparity between the rates of downward departures and
variances given to white versus non-white drug offenders. This Comment will argue that despite the implicit goal of the Sentencing Reform
Act of 1984 (hereinafter “the SRA”)—and thus the creation and implementation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines—of remedying sentencing disparities due to demographic differences such as race, there
remains significant race disparities in the granting of downward departures and variances by district court judges. As a quasi-case study of this
disparity, this Comment will present how this plays out in the United
States District of Maryland.
ã

2020 Jeremy Ritter-Wiseman
JD candidate, 2021, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. The author
would like to thank Jim Wyda for his helpful guidance and useful edits and suggestions. He
would also like to thank all the editors of the Journal of Race, Religion, Gender and Class.
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1
See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, STATISTICAL INFORMATION PACKET, FISCAL YEAR 2018: DISTRICT
OF MARYLAND 3, Table 1 (Aug. 2019), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/researchand-publications/federal-sentencing-statistics/state-district-circuit/2018/md18.pdf.
2
See id.
3
See id.
4
See Quick Facts: Maryland, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/MD
(last visited Apr. 20, 2020).
5
See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2006-2017 INTERACTIVE SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS Table 32 (2006-2017) (hereinafter “COMBINED SOURCEBOOKS”).
*
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Part I of this Comment traces the history of the United States
Sentencing Guidelines.6 This section will trace the movement towards
sentencing reform beginning in the 1970s and leading to the enactment
of the SRA.7 It will discuss the purported goals of the SRA—namely,
the reduction of judicial discretion and the increase in uniformity in sentencing.8 This section will also explain how the Sentencing Guidelines
were altered as a result of the landmark Supreme Court decisions Apprendi v. New Jersey, and United States v. Booker, the latter having rendered the usage of the Guidelines advisory instead of mandatory.9
Part II discusses the concepts of sentencing departures and sentencing variances more generally.10 This section will first define the
terms and will then explain how courts use departures and variances to
alter sentences to go outside of the prescribed Guideline range.11 More
importantly, this section will show how sentencing variances were essentially created by the Supreme Court’s ruling in Booker, re-opening
the door for judicial discretion and thus less uniformity in sentencing.12
Part III then looks at sentencing data from the United States District of Maryland since 2006.13 The data reveals that in the District of
Maryland, white drug offenders are treated with significantly more leniency than non-white drug offenders through the rate of downward departures and variances.14 The data shows that offenders who commit
crimes involving drugs such as Methamphetamine and Oxycontin/Oxycodone, who are typically white, receive significantly more downward
departures and variances, as compared to offenders who commit crimes
involving Crack, PCP, and Heroin, who are typically non-white.15 This
section also shows how this disparity in Maryland is reflective of a problem on the national level where the data shows similar disparities.16
Part IV discusses how an offender’s criminal history might help
explain the disparity outlined in Part III. 17 Yet, this section also argues

6

See infra Part I.
See infra Part I-A.
8
See infra Part I-A.
9
See infra Part I-B–C; see also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 222 (2005)
10
See infra Part II.
11
See infra Part II-A.
12
See infra Part II-B.
13
See infra Part III.
14
See infra Part III-A.
15
See infra Part III-A.
16
See infra Part III-B.
17
See infra Part IV.
7
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that the computation of an offender’s career history itself has racial implications, including how the “career-offender” provision of the Guidelines unfairly punishes minorities, and the how the reality of over-policing in Baltimore City causes minorities to be arrested with greater
frequency than white persons.18
Based on the data discussed in this Comment, it appears that in
the United States District of Maryland, race plays a role in the granting
of departures and variances, and ultimately in the computation of one’s
sentence.19 White drug offenders are receiving far more departures and
variances than non-white drug offenders.20 To the reformers who pushed
through sentencing reform in the 1970s and 80s, and to the proponents
of greater uniformity in sentencing, this data represents a disheartening
retreat to the pre-Guidelines era which was riddled with inconsistent
sentencing.21
I. THE HISTORY OF THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES
Modern federal sentencing has largely been determined by the
United States Federal Sentencing Guidelines.22 Part I-A. provides a brief
history of the impetus behind the enactment of the SRA, which led to
the creation of the Guidelines.23 Part II-B. and Part II-C. then chart the
changes the Guidelines underwent as a result of landmark Supreme
Court rulings.24
A. Enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984
The history of the United States Sentencing Commission and the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines (hereinafter “the Guidelines”) can be
traced back to the writings of Judge Marvin E. Frankel.25 Frankel, a former judge of the United States District Court for the Southern District

18

See infra Part IV-A-C
See infra Part III-A.
20
See infra Part III.
21
See infra Part I-A.
22
See Mission, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, https://www.ussc.gov/about-page (last visited Apr. 20,
2020).
23
See infra Part I-A.
24
See infra Part II-B-C.
25
See KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS 35 (1998).
19
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of New York, conducted a study in 1972 into sentencing within the Second Circuit.26 Drawing upon his findings, Frankel published his sentencing manifesto that same year, entitled: Criminal Sentences: Law without
Order.27 In his book, Frankel calls for the formation of a “Commission
on Sentencing,” which would be responsible for three things.28 First, the
Commission would be responsible for studying “sentencing, corrections, and parole.”29 The Commission would also formulate laws and
rules, which would be directly informed by the Commission’s studies.30
Third, and most important in Frankel’s eyes, the Commission would enact such rules, which would be binding on federal judges.31
At the time, this proposition was somewhat radical as Congress
had the sole power to promulgate sentencing rules. To confer this power
to an independent Commission would delegate a lawmaking power
away from Congress. However, in regards to sentencing, Frankel found
it necessary for Congress to delegate such power in sentencing as, he
notes, “relative details, numerous and cumulatively important, neither
require nor are likely to receive from the legislature the necessary measure of steady attention.”32 Frankel was “deeply skeptical of judicial discretion,” and believed judicial discretion resulted in “arbitrary cruelties
perpetrated daily.”33
One of Frankel’s biggest admirers was Senator Edward M. Kennedy.34 An equally fierce critic of the sentencing system at the time,
Kennedy was the original sponsor of the SRA.35 After years of fruitless
attempts to pass a sentencing reform bill, Kennedy’s—and thus
Frankel’s—goal was finally realized when Congress passed the SRA in
1984 with significant bipartisan support.36 In passing the SRA, Congress

26

See id.; see also Frankel, Marvin, E., FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/frankel-marvin-e (last visited Apr. 20, 2020).
27
MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1972).
28
Id. at 119.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
FRANKEL, supra note 27, at 122.
33
STITH & CABRANES, supra note 25, at 35–36 (quoting FRANKEL, supra, note 27, at 103)).
34
Id. at 35 (Kennedy once dubbed Judge Frankel the “father of sentencing reform” (citing 128
Cong. Rec. 26503 (1982)).
35
Id. at 38 (Senator Kennedy had described sentencing in federal courts in markedly harsh
terms including calling it “a disgrace,” “hopelessly inconsistent” and “desperately in need of
reform”).
36
Brent E. Newton and Dawinder S. Sidhu, The History of the Original United States Sentencing Commission, 1985-1987, 45 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1167, 1184 (2017).
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had two primary goals.37 First, Congress wanted to increase “honesty in
sentencing.”38 By “honesty,” Congress meant to remedy the scenario
whereby a judge would sentence an individual to prison for a specific
amount of time, only for that individual to be released by a Parole Commission after completing a fraction of that sentence.39
The second stated purpose was to narrow sentencing disparities.40 The enactment of the SRA sought to correct the problem where
two offenders, convicted of similar crimes, would receive far different
sentences merely because they were sentenced by different judges.41
Known as the “inter-judge disparity,” a 1974 study published by the
Federal Judicial Center revealed the depth of this problem by showing
that fifty federal judges in the same circuit, who were given twenty hypothetical cases, varied wildly in their proposed sentences.42 Senators
who drafted the SRA cited this study, describing the variations in sentences as “astounding.”43
The primary tool in Congress’ toolbelt to address sentencing disparities was one of Frankel’s creation, the U.S. Sentencing Commission
(hereinafter “the Commission”).44 The Commission consisted of a bipartisan committee and two “nonvoting members.”45 The Commission
was mandated to, among other things, draft guidelines that would avoid
“unwarranted disparities among defendants . . . found guilty of similar
criminal conduct while maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences . . . by mitigating or aggravating factors not taken
into account in the establishment of the guidelines.”46
One type of disparity the Commission hoped to remedy was sentencing disparities attributable to race.47 In the buildup to the passing of
37
Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which
They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 4 (1988) (citing Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837)).
38
Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 54, 56, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3237, 3239)).
39
Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 56, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3239))/
40
Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 38, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3221)).
41
Newton & Sidhu, supra note 36, at 1178–79.
42
Id. at 1179 (citing ANTHONY PARTRIDGE & WILLIAM B. ELDRIDGE, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE
SECOND CIRCUIT SENTENCING STUDY: A REPORT TO THE JUDGES OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT 5, 9–
10 (1974)).
43
Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 98–225, at 41 (1983)).
44
Breyer, supra note37, at 5; Newton & Sidhu, supra note36, at 1184 (“Congress followed
Judge Frankel’s suggestion, creating a bipartisan Commission . . . .”).
45
Newton & Sidhu, supra note 36, at 1184 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1988)).
46
Id. at 1185 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (1988)) (internal quotations omitted).
47
Id. at 1180–81.
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the SRA, it was “widely acknowledged” that demographic factors, especially race and gender, contributed to sentencing disparities.48 Particularly, studies revealed that one’s race may correlate to how harsh or
lenient a judge would be in sentencing.49 Narrowing sentencing disparities was therefore a “key motivation” behind the promulgation of the
sentencing guidelines.50 One of the co-sponsors of the SRA, then-Senator Joseph R. Biden of Delaware, underscored the need to cure the current sentencing system of its invidious disparities during debate on the
SRA:
[U]nder the present sentencing system . . . most of the
people who wind up in jail are people who are poor, and
people who are black and people who are from a minority . . . [T]he studies show the white middle-class guy
gets a more lenient sentence than the black guy, and you
know that is kind of disturbing. We find out judges are
not color blind and judges do not leave their baggage at
home. And we found there is significant disparity in how
judges apply the sentences when they see defendants.51
After its creation, the Commission confirmed this uncomfortable reality by conducting its own study which showed similar disparities
attributable to race.52 Overall, in passing the SRA, and in authoring the
Guidelines, unfair sentencing disparities due to race were top-of-mind
to the proponents of sentencing reform.53
48
Id. at 1180; see also William W. Wilkins, Jr. et al., The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: A
Bold Approach to the Unwarranted Sentencing Disparity Problem, 2 CRIM. L.F. 355, 359 (1991)
(citing Gary Kleck, Racial Discrimination in Criminal Sentencing, 46 AM. SOC. REV. 783, 784
(1981) (“In his review of more than sixty empirical studies related to racial discrimination at
sentencing, Gary Kleck summarized findings by identifying five categories of sentencing practices that might produce differential results based on race”)).
49
See JOAN PETERSILIA, RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 3 (1983) (finding evidence that minorities were treated more severely in sentencing: “[f]or the same crime and
with similar criminal records, whites are more likely to get probation, to go to jail instead of
prison, to receive shorter sentences, and to serve less time behind bars than minority offenders”).
50
Lucius T. Outlaw III, Time for a Divorce: Uncoupling Drug Offenses from Violent Offenses
in Federal Sentencing Law, Policy, and Practice, 44 AM. J. CRIM. L. 220, 228 (2017); see also
Wilkins, Jr. et al., supra note 48, at 364 (noting that the “elimination of unwarranted sentencing
disparity” was a “principal goal” of the SRA).
51
Wilkins, Jr. et al., supra note 48, at 366 (quoting 130 Cong. Rec. 839 (1984)).
52
Id. at 366–67.
53
Newton & Sidhu, supra note 36, at 1180–81 (citing Wilkins, Jr. et al., supra note 48, at 362
(“As stated by the original chair of the Commission, Judge William W. Wilkins, Jr., and two
leading original staff members in 1991: ‘Suffice it to say it was against this backdrop of such
unfair sentencing practices that the most recent attempt at sentencing reform was conceived and
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B. Apprendi v. New Jersey: The Precursor to Booker
In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Supreme Court addressed the
constitutionality of a New Jersey hate crime statute.54 The statute provided for “an extended term of imprisonment” if the trial judge found
that a defendant committed the underlying offense with the purpose of
intimidating a protected subclass.55 In 1994, Petitioner Charles C. Apprendi, Jr. pleaded guilty to two counts of second-degree possession of
a firearm for an unlawful person, carrying a sentence of between five
and ten years in prison, after he admitted to firing bullets into the home
of an African-American family.56 As part of the plea deal, the State reserved the right to request an enhanced sentence under New Jersey’s
hate crime statute and Mr. Apprendi reserved the right to challenge the
enhancement on constitutional grounds.57 Following a plea hearing
where the trial judge accepted Mr. Apprendi’s guilty plea, the State
moved for an enhanced sentence.58 Soon after, the trial judge held an
evidentiary hearing for the purpose of determining Mr. Apprendi’s “purpose” for the shooting.59 After hearing testimony, the judge found by a
preponderance of the evidence that “the [underlying] crime was motivated by racial bias” and consequently enhanced Mr. Apprendi’s sentence.60
The Supreme Court granted cert to determine whether the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires “that a factual
determination authorizing an increase in the maximum prison sentence
. . . be made by a jury on the basis of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”61
Writing for a 5-4 majority, Justice Stevens referred to the reasonable
doubt standard as “vital” in order to protect against erroneous loss of
“liberty upon conviction,” as well as the stigma of conviction.62 Therefore, it follows:
developed, culminating in legislation that created the . . . Commission and the federal sentencing
guidelines’”)).
54
530 U.S. 466, 468–69 (2000).
55
Id. (quoting N.J STAT. ANN. § 2c:44-3(e) (1999)) (internal quotations omitted)).
56
Id. at 469–70.
57
Id. at 470.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 470-71.
60
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 471 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. 143a); Id. at 470–71 (stating that if
the trial judge found that there was no motivation based on racial bias, the convictions would
have carried a maximum sentence in the aggregate of 20 years. But because the trial judge applied the enhancement, the maximum on that one count alone would be 20 years).
61
Id. at 469.
62
Id. at 484 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970)).
There, the Court found unconstitutional a New York statute permitting a judge to find by a
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[i]f a defendant faces punishment beyond that provided
by statute when an offense is committed under certain
circumstances but not others, it is obvious that both the
loss of liberty and the stigma attaching to the offense are
heightened; it necessarily follows that the defendant
should not—at the moment the State is put to proof of
those circumstances—be deprived of protections that
have, until that point, unquestionably attached.63
In other words, if a defendant faces a sentence enhancement that
goes beyond the bounds of the statute and is based on a fact that is not
an element of the crime, that fact should have to be proven to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt.64
At the heart of the Court’s reasoning was the apparent lack of a
distinction between an “element” of a crime and a “sentencing factor.”65
To the Court, the analysis rested on what effect a factor has on the defendant’s punishment.66 If a sentencing factor “expose[s] the defendant
to a greater punishment,” it is indistinguishable from an element of the
offense which must be submitted to the jury.67
This is not to say, however, that a “sentencing factor” has no
meaning. The Court determined that while a “sentencing factor” can
have an aggravating or mitigating effect in sentencing, it nevertheless
“supports a specific sentence within the range authorized by the jury’s
finding that the defendant is guilty of a particular offense.”68 Conversely, an enhancement based on a “sentencing factor” is an increase
beyond the maximum authorized sentence, and is thus the “functional
equivalent” to an element of the offense.69 Moreover, the holding by the
Court declared that an element of an offense is “any fact that increases

preponderance of the evidence whether a juvenile had committed a crime, violating the Fourteenth Amendment. The decision set the prevailing standard that every element of a crime must
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to convict). In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 359–64.
63
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 484.
64
Id.; Id. at 490 (“Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty
for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt”).
65
Id. at 494 (referencing McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 86 (1986) overruled by Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 105 (2013)).
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 n.19 (emphasis in original).
69
Id.
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the maximum statutory penalty for the crime.”70 In her dissenting opinion, Justice O’Connor forebodingly highlights that the Court’s ruling
essentially invalidates the Guidelines.71 Because Apprendi severely limits a judge’s ability to make factual determinations, which the Guidelines rely heavily on, the Court’s ruling in Apprendi paved the way for
the Court’s ruling that followed in Booker.72
C. United States v. Booker: The Reintroduction of Judicial
Discretion
The immediate precursor to the Supreme Court’s ruling in
United States v. Booker was the Court’s decision in Blakely v. Washington, in 2004.73 In Blakely, the Court addressed Washington State’s Sentencing Reform Act, which permitted a judge to depart from a statutory
maximum if the judge found that the defendant acted with “deliberate
cruelty.”74 In other words, a judge could enhance a sentence based on a
finding of fact that was not submitted to a jury. Applying their ruling
from Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that a defendant in Washington
state had “the right to insist that the prosecutor prove to a jury all facts
legally essential to the punishment,” and found that the sentence at question, as applied by the Washington state judge, violated the defendant’s
Sixth Amendment rights.75 In a dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer dubiously pondered how the Court’s holding could be reconciled with the
Guidelines, foreshadowing the Court’s holding in Booker only six
months later.76
1. The Court’s Holding
Freddie Booker was charged with possession with intent to distribute at least 50 grams of crack cocaine and was found guilty by a jury
of violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).77 The statute provided for a minimum
sentence of 10 years in prison.78 When combined with Booker’s criminal
70
Andrew J. Fuchs, Note, The Effect of Apprendi v. New Jersey on the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: Blurring the Distinction Between Sentencing Factors and Elements of a Crime, 69
FORDHAM L. REV. 1399, 1419 (2001).
71
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 544 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
72
See Fuchs, supra note 70, at 1434.
73
542 U.S. 296 (2004).
74
Id. at 300 (citing WASH. REV. CODE §9.94A.390(2)(h)(iii) (statute transferred to WASH. REV.
CODE 9.94A.535 (2019)).
75
Id. at 313 (emphasis in original).
76
Id. at 346 (Breyer, J., dissenting); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226-27 (2005).
77
Booker, 543 U.S. at 227.
78
Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii))(2018)).
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history, the Guidelines required the district court judge to assign Booker
a “base” sentence of at least 210 months, nearly 22 years in prison.79
The district court judge then held a post-trial sentencing proceeding and found by a preponderance of the evidence that Booker possessed an additional 566 grams and that he was also guilty of obstructing
justice.80 The judge’s additional findings required Booker’s base sentence to be increased to a minimum of 360 months, or 30 years in
prison.81 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit found that the sentence did not
comport with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Apprendi and reversed.82
The Supreme Court granted the Government’s petition for writ of certiorari to determine whether the Court’s “Apprendi line of cases applies
to the Sentencing Guidelines, and if so, what portions of the Guidelines
remain in effect.”83 The Court’s opinion in Booker was delivered in two
parts.84 In the first opinion, Justice Stevens addressed the constitutionality of the Guidelines.85 Upon finding the mandatory requirement of the
Guidelines to be unconstitutional, Justice Breyer then attempted to reconcile the Guidelines with the Court’s constitutional holding.86
Justice Stevens first addressed whether the application of the
Guidelines offended the Booker’s Sixth Amendment protections.87
Finding “no distinction of constitutional significance between the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Washington procedures” at issue in
Blakely, the Court held that “the Sixth Amendment as construed in
Blakely” applies to the Guidelines as well.88 Therefore, any fact “which
is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized
by the facts . . . must be . . . proved to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt.”89
Importantly, Justice Stevens noted that if the Guidelines were
instead merely advisory, instead of mandatory, “their use would not implicate the Sixth Amendment,” because, as Stevens points out, the Court
79

Id.; U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.1 (Nov. 2003),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-manual/2003/manual/CHAP4.pdf.
80
Booker, 543 U.S. at 227.
81
Id.
82
Id. at 227–28.
83
Id. at 229. The Court also granted cert to address a similar sentencing scenario regarding
Respondent Ducan Fanfan. However, for brevity’s sake, because the question presented to the
Court was unchanged as between Booker and Fanfan, only the facts from Respondent Booker’s
case are reproduced here. Id. at 227–28.
84
Id. at 225.
85
Booker, 543 U.S. at 230.
86
Id. at 245–46.
87
Id. at 226.
88
Id. at 226–27, 233.
89
Id. at 244.
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recognizes a sentencing judge’s discretionary authority when imposing
a sentence “within a statutory range.”90
Justice Breyer’s opinion then attempted to salvage what he could
of the Guidelines by “determin[ing] what Congress would have intended in light of” the Court’s constitutional holding.91 Breyer concluded that had Congress “been faced with the constitutional jury trial
requirement” from the Court’s constitutional holding, Congress “likely
would not have passed the same Sentencing Act.”92 Consequently, the
Court adopted an approach that excised two provisions of the Guidelines
in order to reconcile Congress’ intent with the Court’s constitutional
holding.93
The first excised provision makes the Guidelines binding on federal judges, thus rendering the Guidelines advisory, not mandatory.94
Breyer, one of the architects of the Guidelines, emphasizes that while
the Court is rendering the Guidelines advisory, the Court does not mean
to diminish the “strong connection between the sentence imposed and
the offender’s real conduct,” which was integral to Congress’ attempt to
increase uniformity in sentencing.95
The Court further stressed real offense conduct, that is, the “real
conduct that underlies the crime of conviction,” as being necessary to a
system that reduces sentencing disparities and promotes uniformity,
which was one of Congress’ basic goals in passing the SRA.96 Moreover, de-emphasis on real conduct would have “particularly troubling
consequences” regarding prosecutorial power, according to Breyer.97 Instead of a judge basing a sentence upon the actual conduct of the offender, sentences would largely be determined by the “conduct the prosecutor chose to charge,” which the Court noted was a power that the

90

Booker, 543 U.S. at 233.
Id. at 246 (citing Denver Area Ed. Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S.
727, 767 (1996)) (internal quotations removed).
92
Id. at 258.
93
Id. at 246. The second provision the Court severed from Act is the provision setting forth
“standards of review on appeal, including de novo review of departures from the applicable
Guidelines range, see [18 U.S.C.] § 3742(e),” because that provision “contains critical crossreferences to the (now-excised) § 3553(b)(1) and consequently must be severed and excised for
similar reasons” (emphasis in original). Id. at 259–60. Although a consequential ruling in itself,
that Court’s excision of that provision is irrelevant to the topic of this paper and is thus unaddressed.
94
Id. at 245.
95
Booker, 543 U.S. at 246.
96
Id. at 250, 253.
97
Id. at 256.
91
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SRA vested in judges.98 Thus, to help preserve the SRA’s emphasis on
real-offense conduct, the Court urged that even though the Guidelines
would not be advisory, the SRA “nonetheless requires judges to take
account of the Guidelines together with other sentencing goals.”99
In sum, Breyer explains how the Court’s ruling still advances the
impetus that led to the Guidelines being enacted in the first place:
“[t]hese features of the remaining system, while not the system Congress enacted, nonetheless continue to move sentencing in Congress’
preferred direction, helping to avoid excessive sentencing disparities
while maintaining flexibility sufficient to individualize sentences where
necessary.”100 Moreover, the Court’s ruling kept the Sentencing Commission intact, further directing it to continue to “writ[e] Guidelines,
collect[] information . . . undertake[] research,” and to revise the Guidelines accordingly.101 Breyer concluded by stressing that the Court’s decision was not the final say on the matter, as Congress remained free to
amend the SRA to comport with the Constitution in a way that “Congress judges best for the federal system of justice.”102
2. The Effect on the Guidelines
Unsurprisingly, Booker was seen as “an earthquake” to the sentencing status quo.103 However, preceding Booker was a long line of Supreme Court decisions that increasingly chipped away at the Guidelines.104 One of the most significant immediate changes from Booker

98

Id. “[T]he power to decide, based on relevant information about the offense and the offender,
which defendants merit heavier punishment.” Id. at 257; see also David Yellen, Reforming the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines’ Misguided Approach to Real-Offense Sentencing, 58 STAN. L.
REV. 267, 268 (2005) (explaining the opposite of real-offense sentencing, known as “chargeoffense sentencing.” Charge-offense sentencing refers to the setting of a sentence or sentencing
range “based entirely on the statute of conviction”).
99
Id. at 259; see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2018) (other sentencing goals includes, inter alia, “[T]he
need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have
been found guilty of similar conduct”).
100
Booker, 543 U.S. at 264–65.
101
Id. at 264.
102
Id. at 265.
103
Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Disparity: Assessing
the Role of Prosecutors and the Effects of Booker, 123 YALE L. J. 1, 15 (2013).
104
See e.g., Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 248 (1999) (holding that “facts determining
a statutory sentencing range” must be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable
doubt); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (holding that any fact other than a
prior conviction which would increase the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum
“must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt”); Ring v. Arizona, 536
U.S. 584, 589 (2002) (holding that capital defendants, under the Sixth Amendment, are entitled
to have “any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punishment,”
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was that federal sentencing judges gained far more discretion.105 The
other significant development, likely a direct cause of the first, was the
rate at which judges sentenced offenders to sentences within the prescribed Guideline range. In the year prior to Booker, 72% of all federal
sentences were within the Guideline range, meaning 28% of all federal
offenders received some time of departure, either downward or upward.106 In the eleven months following Booker, the percentage of sentences that fell within the range dropped to 61.2% nationally.107 This
was more than double than the previous largest year-to-year variation in
sentence-rates that fell within the Guidelines.108 This statistic evidences
the single most consequential change stemming from Booker—specifically, that sentencing judges were now more willing to use their discretion to go outside of the Guidelines. This development was also reflected in the Commission’s creation of a new statistical category in
response to Booker: the “variance.”109
II. UNDERSTANDING DEPARTURES AND VARIANCES
A. Departures and Variances, Defined
As defined by the United States Sentencing Commission, a sentence departure can be one of three things.110 A departure can be a sentence that falls “outside the guideline range.”111 It can be a sentence that
is “otherwise different from the guideline sentence,” or a departure can
be an “assignment of a criminal history category other than the otherwise applicable criminal history category, in order to effect a sentence
outside the applicable guideline range.”112 A departure is most often triggered upon a government motion “to reward cooperation.”113
be presented to a jury); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305–06 (2004) (finding a Washington state statute that permitted a judge to increase a sentence beyond the statutory maximum
based on a fact that was not presented to the jury as offensive to the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments in light of the Court’s holding from Apprendi).
105
Frank O. Bowman, III, The Year of Jubilee . . . Or Maybe Not: Some Preliminary Observations About the Operation of the Federal Sentencing System After Booker, 43 HOUSTON L. REV.
279, 280 (2006).
106
Id. at 297.
107
Id.
108
Id. at 300.
109
Id. at 305.
110
U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, PRIMER: DEPARTURES AND VARIANCES 1 (2019),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/primers/2019_Primer_Departure_Variance.pdf (hereinafter “PRIMER ON DEPARTURES AND VARIANCES”).
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id.
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A “downward departure” is defined as “a court’s discretionary
imposition of a sentence more lenient than the standard [G]uidelines
propose, as when the facts militate in favor of a lesser punishment.”114
Accordingly, an upward departure is a harsher sentence than what the
Guidelines propose, “when the court concludes that a criminal’s history
did not take into account additional offenses committed by the prisoner.”115 Simply put, a downward departure adjusts the Guideline range
to below what the range would otherwise be, and an upward departure
adjusts the range to go above it.116
Whereas a sentencing departure diverges from what the Guidelines propose based on reasons contained within the Guidelines themselves, a sentencing variance is a divergence from the Guidelines based
solely on the “exercise of the court’s discretion under § 3553(a).”117
Eighteen U.S.C. § 3553(a) directs sentencing judges to impose sentences that comply with the following sentencing purposes:
the need . . . (A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense,
to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from
further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide the
defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the
most effective manner[.]118
In other words, departures were incorporated as part of the
Guidelines when the Commission first established them, permitting
judges to exercise discretion, but limiting those discretions to “departure
authority” contemplated by the Commission’s policy statements.119 Variances, though, are sentences that are “neither within the applicable
[g]uidelines range nor imposed pursuant to the departure authority in
the Commission’s policy statements.”120Although slight, the differences
between departures and variances are important as they are subject to
114

Downward Departure, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
Upward Departure, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
116
Compare supra note 114, with supra note 115.
117
United States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 317 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Floyd,
499 F.3d 308, 311 (3d Cir. 2007)).
118
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)–(D) (2018).
119
PRIMER ON DEPARTURES AND VARIANCES, supra note 110, at 2 (a sentence with a departure
is a sentence technically still within the Guidelines as it is imposed “pursuant to the departure
provisions of the policy statements in the guidelines” (citing United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d
103, 111 n.9 (2d Cir. 2005)).
120
Id. (alteration in original) (citing Crosby, 397 F.3d at 111 n.9)).
115
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different analysis and notice requirements.121 Moreover, when a judge
believes that a sentence under the Guidelines is too harsh, and the available departures offer no recourse, the judge may instead vary to go outside of the Guidelines.122
B. Booker and Variances
Booker had little to no effect on sentencing departures.123 Contrarily, sentencing variances were essentially created by the Court’s
holding in Booker.124 Variances grant district courts the ultimate authority when imposing a sentence, “regardless of what the guideline range
is found to be,” if the court views the sentence as “sufficient, but not
greater than necessary” to meet the goals outlined in § 3553(a).125 A
critical case in understanding Booker’s effect on how courts may vary,
especially in regard to drug cases, is Kimbrough v. United States.126
In Kimbrough, the Supreme Court addressed a portion of the
Guidelines that exhibited a substantial disparity in punishments regarding crack and powder cocaine.127 As enacted, the Guidelines imposed
the same punishment for a drug trafficker dealing in crack cocaine as
one dealing in 100 times more powder cocaine.128 The Court held that a
district court judge “may determine . . . that . . . a within-Guidelines sentence is ‘greater than necessary’ to serve the objectives of sentencing,”
as established in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).129 When doing so, the judge is
permitted to consider “the disparity between the Guidelines’ treatment
of crack and powder cocaine offenses.”130
Kimbrough was important for two reasons. First, it was the first
time the Supreme Court addressed the “demonstrably false predicate
121
Id. at 44 (“Courts have held that variances are not subject to the guideline analysis for departures”).
122
Id. (“In some situations, a prohibited ground for departure may be a valid basis for a variance”).
123
See id. at 10 (expounding on the impact of Booker on “Criminal History Departures,” by
noting that “since the 2005 Booker decision, courts may vary, rather than depart, from the guidelines” when considering departures based on an offender’s criminal history); see also id. at 13
(regarding Booker’s effect, or lack thereof, on substantial assistance motions, explaining that
“[s]ince Booker, the procedure for granting a substantial assistance motion has remained largely
unchanged”).
124
See PRIMER ON DEPARTURES AND VARIANCES, supra note 110, at 10, 13.
125
Id. at 44 (emphasis added) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2018)).
126
See infra note 134.
127
552 U.S. 85, 91 (2007).
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Id.
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understandings” of crack offenses and the people who commit them.131
The Court noted that in a series of reports, the Sentencing Commission
concluded that the large disparity reflected in the differing punishments
between crack and powder cocaine engenders distrust of the criminal
justice system due to the “widely-held perception” that the disparity is
driven by race.132 After numerous pleas to Congress to reduce the disparate ratio, the Commission independently implemented a “modest
amendment” to ameliorate the disparity, but conceded that the amendment represented only “a partial remedy.”133
Secondly, Kimbrough established the precedent for courts to
vary from the Guidelines based solely on “policy disagreements.”134 Reaffirming their holding in Kimbrough in a later case, the Court acknowledged that its holding “was a recognition of district courts’ authority to
vary from the crack cocaine guidelines based on policy disagreement
with them, and not simply based on an individualized determination that
they yield an excessive sentence in a particular case.”135
Other than permitting courts to vary from the Guidelines, what
Booker did more than anything, though, was to reintroduce judicial discretion back into the sentencing process.136 Beginning with Judge
Frankel’s work on illuminating the alleged evils of judicial discretion,
the sentencing reform movement hoped to rid unwelcome judicial discretion through the passage of the SRA.137 The original purpose of statutorily requiring judges to abide by the Guidelines was the single most
important factor in remedying invidious sentencing disparities.138 Thus,
by allowing federal district judges to vary from the Guidelines recommendation, the underlying purposes of the SRA and the Guidelines were
undone by the Court’s decision in Booker.139 The following data on drug

131
Brief for The American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007) (No. 06-6330).
132
Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 98 (citing U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: COCAINE
AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 103 (May 2002)) (internal quotations omitted); the Court
also notes that “[a]pproximately 85 percent of defendants convicted of crack offenses in federal
court are black; thus the severe sentences required by the 100-to-1 ratio are imposed ‘primarily
upon black offenders’.” Id.
133
Id. at 99–100 (citing Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts,
72 Fed. Reg. 28571-72 (2007)).
134
Leading Cases, 122 HARV. L. REV. 276, 326 (2008).
135
PRIMER ON DEPARTURES AND VARIANCES, supra note 110, at 54 (emphasis in original) (citing Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 264 (2009) (per curiam)).
136
See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245–46 (2005).
137
See supra Part I-A.
138
Wilkins, Jr. et al., supra note 48, at 369.
139
See Booker, 543 U.S. at 245–46.
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sentencing in the District of Maryland highlights how the granting of
departures and variances has introduced new disparities since Booker.
III. THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
A. Disparities in the Granting of Departures and Variances Based
on Race
Between 2006 and 2017, the United States District of Maryland
saw 9,280 offenders prosecuted for a federal crime.140 Of those 9,280
offenders, over one third were drug offenders.141 Of those offenders, the
ones prosecuted for crimes involving certain drug-types, such a Methamphetamine and Oxycodone/Oxycontin, are predominantly white.142
Conversely, other offenders, the ones prosecuted for crimes involving
drugs such as Crack Cocaine, Heroin, and PCP, are mostly non-white.143
What the following data shows is that, in the District of Maryland, the
drug-types with a higher percentage of white offenders result in far more
lenient sentences through downward departures and variances than
drug-types with mostly non-white offenders.
Pursuant to 28 U.S. Code § 997, the United States Sentencing
Commission issues an annual report to each branch of government, detailing “the activities of the Commission.”144 The Commission refers to
these reports as the Commission’s “Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing
Statistics.”145 The Sourcebook contains statistics on “the application of
the federal sentencing guidelines” and provides national data as well as
data on individual United States districts and circuits.146 Additionally,
the Commission provides an “Interactive Sourcebook,” which allows
for the aggregation of multiple years of data.147 To observe how departures and variances have played-out since Booker, I looked at the combined statistics in the District of Maryland, from fiscal years 2006 to
2017.148
140

COMBINED SOURCEBOOKS, supra note 5.
Id.
142
Id.
143
See COMBINED SOURCEBOOKS, supra note 5, for explanation of “non-white offenders.”
144
28 U.S.C. § 997 (1984).
145
U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2018 ANNUAL REPORT AND SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS 28 (2019), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2018/2018-Annual-Report-and-Sourcebook.pdf.
146
Id.
147
COMBINED SOURCEBOOKS, supra note 5.
148
2006 is the year after Booker, and thus the first year where a judge was allowed to go outside
of the Guidelines range.
141
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The Sourcebook allows one to identify the race composition of
drug offenders in each drug-type. For instance, between 2006-2017,
there have been 1,070 individuals convicted of a crime involving “Powder Cocaine,” in the District of Maryland, of which 67.2% are black.149
Below is a table showing the race composition of drug offenders in each
drug-type.
Table 1: Race of Drug Offenders in Drug-Type in the District of Maryland (2006-2017)150

Drug Type
Powder Cocaine
Crack Cocaine
Heroin
Marijuana
Methamphetamine
Oxycodone/Oxycontin
PCP

Number

White
(%)

Black
(%)

Hispanic
(%)

Other
(%)

NonWhite
Total
(%)151

1,070

15.5

67.2

16.8

0.5

84.5

738
834
228

8.0
7.6
28.1

87.9
85.3
62.3

4.1
7.0
5.3

0.0
0.2
4.4

92.0
92.5
72.0

64

59.4

10.9

9.4

20.3

40.6

133

53.4

42.1

2.3

2.3

46.7

74

5.4

91.9

2.7

0.0

94.6

The table shows that the drug types with the largest percentage
of white offenders are Methamphetamine (hereinafter “Meth”) and Oxycodone/Oxycontin (hereinafter “Oxy”), consisting of 59.4% and
53.4% white offenders respectively.152 Conversely, the drug types with
the largest percentage of non-white offenders are Crack Cocaine, Heroin, and PCP,153 all of which are above 90%.154
Below is a table that shows sentences, relative to Guideline
ranges, for each drug-type. It shows the percent receiving sentences
149

COMBINED SOURCEBOOKS, supra note 5.
Id. This data was obtained through the Commission’s Interactive Sourcebook. Once you
choose a certain table to view, in this instance, Table 34 of the 2017 Interactive Sourcebook
titled “Race of Drug Offenders in Each Drug Type,” you can filter the data to show all offenders
since 2006, and also narrow to view only the District of Maryland. Id.
151
This statistic is not included in the COMBINED SOURCEBOOKS but it is included here to represent offenses committed by minority groups in total. It includes offenders identified as Black,
Hispanic, Native American/Alaskan Native, Asian or Pacific Islander, Multi-Racial, and Other.
152
COMBINED SOURCEBOOKS, supra note 5.
153
Phencyclidine, also known as “PCP” or “angel dust,” is a hallucinogenic drug. Phencyclidine,
DRUG
ENFORCEMENT
ADMIN.
(Mar.
2020),
https://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/drug_chem_info/pcp.pdf.
154
COMBINED SOURCEBOOKS, supra note 5.
150
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within the range prescribed by the Guidelines; the total percentage all
upward departures and variances; the percentage who receive a §5K1.1
departure;155 the percentage of those receiving all other downward departures; and the percentage who receive a downward variance.
Table 2: Sentences Relative to the Guidelines Range for Drug Offenders in Each
Primary Drug Type in the District of Maryland (2006-2017)156

Drug Type

Powder Cocaine
Crack Cocaine
Heroin
Marijuana
Methamphetamine
Oxycodone/Oxycontin
PCP

Number

Within
Guideline
Range
(%)

1,071
738
833
228

28.7
34.0
29.9
30.7

Total
Upward
Departures
and
Variances
(%)157
2.0
2.2
3.2
1.3

64

12.5

0.0

56.3

10.9

18.8

133

14.3

0.0

42.9

19.6

23.4

74

43.2

1.4

27.0

13.5

14.9

§5K1.1
(%)

Other
Downward
Departures
(%)158

Downward
Variance
(%)159

39.8
31.8
31.2
35.1

16.7
19.0
24.1
15.3

11.9
12.7
10.9
15.4

There are a few figures of note in this table. The column labeled
“§5K1.1,” pertains to one of the most frequently utilized downward
departures.160 This provision of the Guidelines allows the court to depart
from the Guideline range only upon a motion by the prosecutor “stating
that the defendant has provided substantial assistance in the
investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an
offense.”161 From the table, the drug types receiving the most §5K1.1
155

See supra note 145.
COMBINED SOURCEBOOKS, supra note 5.
157
This column combines the following categories: Upward Departures; Upward Departures
w/ Booker; Above Range w/ Booker; Remaining Above Range. Id.
158
This column combines the following categories: § 5K3.1 – Early Disposition; Other Gov’t
Sponsored; Downward Departure; Downward Departure w/ Booker. Id.
159
This column combined the categories, “Below Range w/ Booker,” and “Remaining Below
Range.” Id.
160
COMBINED SOURCEBOOKS, supra note 5.
161
U.S.
SENT’G
COMM’N,
GUIDELINES
MANUAL
§5K1.1
(Nov.
2018),
https://www.ussc.gov/guidelines/2018-guidelines-manual/2018-chapter-5#5k11. Upon such
motion from the government, a court may depart for reasons that include, but are not limited to,
the following: “(1) the court’s evaluation of the significance and usefulness of the defendant’s
assistance, taking into consideration the government’s evaluation of the assistance rendered; (2)
156
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departures, are: Meth (56.3%) and Oxy (42.9%).162 Referring back to
Table 1, Meth and Oxy also have the largest percentage of white offenders of all of the drug types.163 Conversely, the drugs offenders receiving
the least amount of §5K1.1 departures are those who are charged with
crimes involving PCP (27%), Crack Cocaine (31.8%), and Heroin
(35.1%).164 Again referring back to Table 1, these three drug types also
include the largest percentage of non-white offenders.165
Another figure that stands out is the column labeled, “Downward Variance.”166 These are sentences in which the court has imposed
a sentence that goes below the Guideline range, citing a reason based
not on the Guidelines, but on 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).167 Again, the drug
offenders receiving the most downward variances are offenders who are
prosecuted for Oxy (23.4%)168 and Meth (18.8%) related offenses.169 To
show the stark disparity in sentencing based on the drug-type, Table 3,
below, shows the percent of non-white offenders and the total percentage of all downward departures and variances.

the truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of any information or testimony provided by the
defendant; (3) the nature and extent of the defendant’s assistance; (4) any injury suffered, or any
danger or risk of injury to the defendant or his family resulting from his assistance; (5) the
timeliness of the defendant’s assistance.” Id.
162
COMBINED SOURCEBOOKS, supra note 5.
163
Id.
164
Id.
165
Id.
166
See supra note 157.
167
See supra note 118.
168
It is important to note that while the rest of the drugs mentioned in this paper carry mandatory minimum sentences, crimes involving the illegal possession or sale of Oxycodone/Oxycontin do not. See 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2018).
169
COMBINED SOURCEBOOKS, supra note 5.
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Table 3: Percentage of Non-White Offenders by Drug Type Combined with Percentage of Total Downward Departures and Variances by Drug Type in the District of Maryland (2006-2017)170

1,071
738
833
228
64

Non-White Total (%)
84.5
92.0
92.5
72.0
40.6

Total Downward (%)171
68.4
63.5
66.2
65.8
85.9

133

46.7

86.0

74

94.6

55.4

Drug Type

Number

Powder Cocaine
Crack Cocaine
Heroin
Marijuana
Methamphetamine
Oxycodone/Oxycontin
PCP

Here, it can be clearly seen that the drug types with the lowest
percentage of non-white offenders, PCP and Crack Cocaine, by far, receive the smallest percentage of total downward departures and variances.172 Conversely, the drug types with the highest percentage of white
offenders, Oxy and Meth, have significantly higher rates of downward
departures and variances.173 Because there seems to be an apparent correlation between drug-type and race, and because there is further correlation between drug-type and one’s chances of receiving a downward
departure or variance, these numbers reveal a serious sentencing disparity attributable to one’s race at play in the District of Maryland. However, this trend is not confined to the District of Maryland alone.
B. Reflection of a National Problem
The data outlined in the preceding subsection is also borne out
in the national statistics, highlighting a larger problem. The following
table is a duplication of Table 3, but with national statistics.

170

Id.
This column combines the following categories: §5K1.1 Substantial Assistance; §5K3.1
Early Disposition; Other Gov’t Sponsored; Downward Departure; Downward Departure w/
Booker; Below Range w/ Booker; Remaining Below Range. Id.
172
See supra Table 3.
173
See supra Table 3.
171
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Table 4: National Percentage of Non-White Offenders by Drug Type Combined
with Percentage of Total Downward Departures and Variances by Drug Type
(2006-2017)174

64,381
46,209
24,574
64,180
64,822

Non-White Total (%)
86.6
92.0
84.8
77.2
55.5

Total Downward (%)
52.8
50.6
59.0
47.0
63.0

7,462

35.6

70.1

734

96.0

55.7

Drug Type

Number

Powder Cocaine
Crack Cocaine
Heroin
Marijuana
Methamphetamine
Oxycodone/Oxycontin
PCP

Although the disparities are a little less stark, the same pattern
can be seen. The drug-type with the lowest percentage of non-white
offenders, Oxy, has the highest rate of downward departures and variances.175 The drug-type with the second lowest percentage of non-white
offenders, Meth, also has the second highest rate of total downward departures and variances.176
Looking then at the two drug-types with the highest percentage
of non-white offenders, PCP and Crack Cocaine, they appear to be
granted the least amount of downward departures and variances, with
the exception of marijuana.177 These statistics largely comport with the
conclusion drawn using the data from the District of Maryland.
IV. AN OFFENDER’S CRIMINAL HISTORY
It would be naïve and improper to assume that the discrepancies
outlined in the preceding section can be explained by racial bias among

174

COMBINED SOURCEBOOKS, supra note 5.
Id.
176
Id.
177
The low amount of marijuana departures and variances can be best explained by the Guidelines’ lenient treatment of marijuana crimes. For instance, an offender who has between 10-20
kilograms of marijuana will be assigned the same base level category of someone who has 1020 grams of heroin, for a ratio of 1,000-1. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 2D1.1 (Nov. 2018), https://www.ussc.gov/guidelines/2018-guidelines-manual/2018-chapter-2-d#NaN.
175
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judges alone. The 600-page Guidelines Manual, published by the Commission, is replete with adjustments that can affect a sentence.178 This
section addresses how the Guidelines take into account an offender’s
criminal history, one of the more significant ways in which a Guideline
range can be altered, and how that criminal history might relate to the
rate at which judges depart and vary downward.179
The argument goes like this: a particular judge might be more
willing to depart or vary for a particular offender with a lower criminal
history category, and vice versa for an offender with a higher criminal
history category. But the determination of an offender’s criminal history
category in itself carries racial implications.180 The inherent racial biases
built into an offender’s criminal history category can cause an
overrepresentation of non-white offenders in the drug-crime statistics.181
Part IV-A. shows how the Guidelines compute an offender’s criminal
history and presents data from the District of Maryland.182 Part IV-B.
discusses the problems with the “Career Offender” designation which
can drastically alter an offender’s criminal history category and result
in much higher sentences.183 Finally, Part IV-C. discusses over-policing
in Baltimore City and how that further explains the higher criminal history categories among non-white drug offenders in Maryland.184
A. Criminal History Category: What the Data Shows
Likely the most significant provision that can affect a particular
Guideline range—other than the crime itself—is an offender’s criminal
history.185 When computing an offender’s sentence, two things are taken
into account: the offense level and the offender’s criminal history category.186 Criminal history categories range from Category I, the least serious, to Category VI, the most severe.187 A particular offender is

178

U.S.
SENT’G
COMM’N,
GUIDELINES
MANUAL
2018
(Nov.
2018),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-manual/2018/GLMFull.pdf [hereinafter USSG].
179
See Outlaw, supra note 50, at 220.
180
Id.
181
See infra Part IV-C.
182
See infra Part IV-A.
183
See infra Part IV-B.
184
See infra Part IV-C.
185
See Outlaw, supra note 50, at 220 (stressing that “[q]ualifying as a career offender changes
the entire landscape of a defendant’s prison exposure. It can transform a sentencing exposure
that would normally be a few years into decades of imprisonment, and even life imprisonment”).
186
See USSG, supra note 178, at 407.
187
Id.
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awarded a certain amount of “points” based on the offender’s prior record, if the offender has one.188 If the crime at issue carries an offense
level of 15, for instance, the Guideline range for an offender with a Category I criminal history is 18-24 months in prison.189 However, if the
same offense level was committed by an individual with a Category VI
criminal history, that range increases to 41-51 months in prison.190 Table
5 below shows the distribution of criminal history categories in each
drug type in the District of Maryland.
Table 5: Criminal History Category of Drug Offenders in Each Drug Type in
the District of Maryland (2006-2017)191
Drug Type

Number

I

II

III

IV

V

VI

Powder Cocaine

1,040
710
804
214

40.0
15.8
32.2
55.6

15.8
13.0
11.1
10.3

15.4
19.3
17.9
13.1

5.9
10.4
6.1
7.9

3.0
4.1
2.0
1.9

18.9
37.5
30.7
11.2

63

71.4

14.3

7.9

0.0

0.0

6.3

128

50.0

9.4

20.3

7.8

3.9

8.6

67

17.9

14.9

22.4

9.0

6.0

29.9

Crack Cocaine
Heroin
Marijuana
Methamphetamine
Oxycodone/Oxycontin
PCP

Most readily apparent is the high percentage of Category VI offenders among drug types with the most non-white offenders versus
drug types with the least non-white offenders.192 Crack Cocaine, Heroin,
and PCP have, by far, the most offenders with the most Category VI
designations, whereas Meth and Oxy have by far the fewest offenders
with a Category VI designation.193 One could be forgiven for logically
188

USSG, supra note 178, at 379–80. The instructions for determining the Criminal History
Category are as follows: (a) Add 3 points for each prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding
one year and one month. (b) Add 2 points for each prior sentence of imprisonment of at least
sixty days not counted in (a). (c) Add 1 point for each prior sentence not counted in (a) or (b),
up to a total of 4 points for this subsection. (d) Add 2 points if the defendant committed the
instant offense while under any criminal justice sentence, including probation, parole, supervised release, imprisonment, work release, or escape status. (e) Add 1 point for each prior sentence resulting from a conviction of a crime of violence that did not receive any points under
(a), (b), or (c) above because such sentence was treated as a single sentence, up to a total of 3
points for this subsection. Id.
189
Id. at 407.
190
Id.
191
COMBINED SOURCEBOOKS, supra note 5.
192
Id.
193
Id.
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concluding, then, that because non-white drug offenders have more serious criminal histories, judges will be more reluctant to depart and vary
downwards. Yet, it is important to note that being presented with an
offender who is assigned a Category VI criminal history category, does
not in any way hinder a judge’s ability to depart and vary downward.
An offender’s criminal history category simply ‘moves the goal-posts’
of an offender’s potential sentence.194 Thus, in theory, the amplifying
effect of an offender’s criminal history category should not drastically
alter the rate of departures and variances, at least, not to the extent discussed in the prior section.
Nevertheless, the above data suggests that one’s race can have
an effect on one’s criminal history category, meaning the computation
of one’s criminal history category has implicit bias built within it.195 One
way this plays out is when offenders qualify as a “career offender.”
B. The Problematic “Career Offender” Guideline
The Guidelines section on computing a defendant’s criminal history contains a subsection that can greatly increase an offender’s criminal history category, even if prior convictions are for relatively innocuous crimes.196 This subsection outlines the problems inherent in the
“career offender” guideline.197 In order to qualify as a career offender, a
defendant must meet three requirements:
A defendant is a career offender if (1) the defendant was
at least eighteen years old at the time the defendant committed the instant offense of conviction; (2) the instant
offense of conviction is a felony that is either a crime of
violence or a controlled substance offense; and (3) the
defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.198
Subsection B of the provision further states that once an offender
qualifies as a career offender, the offender’s criminal history category

194

See Outlaw, supra note 50, at 219 n.9.
See COMBINED SOURCEBOOKS, supra note 5.
196
See Outlaw, supra note 50, at 225 (“[A] defendant with two priors for selling small amount
of drugs is subject to the same offense level, criminal history category, and therefore presumed
sentencing range, as a defendant with two priors for rape, murder, or arson”).
197
USSG, supra note 178, at 395–96.
198
Id. at 395.
195
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automatically becomes Category VI, the most severe category, greatly
increasing the Guideline range.199
The career offender provision, however, is “fraught with potential imprecision” due to the incredible amount of predicate crimes that
can qualify.200 As a result, there is the “potential for wide discrepancy
in the gravity of past antisocial conduct among career offenders.”201 For
instance, an offender who has two prior convictions for violent assaults
will be subjected to the same career offender enhancement as an offender who has two prior convictions for street-level drug sales.202 On
some level, the inclusion of “a crime of violence” makes sense as a predicate felony that would qualify one as a career offender; if an individual
is routinely violent and past sentences have not abated the problem, the
interest in keeping the public safe overtakes any interest in rehabilitation.
What is more problematic, however, is the inclusion of a “controlled substance offense” as the only other set of predicate felonies that
would qualify an offender.203 The presumption that drug offenses are
inextricably linked to violent offenses, a substantial reason why drug
offenders are coupled with violent offenders in the career offender category, has been shown to be without merit.204 Furthermore, the percentage of controlled substance offenders who are non-white greatly outweigh the percentage of white offenders, whereas white-collar crimes,
which can be arguably be as harmful as drug offenses, are committed
predominately by white offenders.205

199

Id. One caveat is that in order to automatically be assigned a criminal history category of
VI, one’s offense must be otherwise lesser than offense levels stated in a table outlined in the
subsection, but it would be rare for this not to occur unless the predicate offense is a serious one
such as murder. Id.
200
United States v. Adkins, 937 F.2d 947, 952 (4th Cir. 1991).
201
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
202
See Outlaw, supra note 50, at 225.
203
Adkins, 937 F.2d at 952.
204
Outlaw, supra note 50, at 230.
205
See Norman Abrams, Assessing the Federal Government’s “War” on White-Collar Crime,
53 TEMP. L. Q. 984, 1001, 1006–07 (1980) (quoting White Collar Crime: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. On Crime of the House Comm. on Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 65–66 (1978)
(testimony of Deputy Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti) (“Some in our society erroneously
assume that white-collar offenses affect only the money or property rights of affluent individuals
or the public or private institutions who can well afford the loss. Such offenses, however, have
both a direct and indirect impact on all social classes and often inflict their greatest harm on the
poor, the infirm and other segments of society that can least afford it. Further, the impact of
white-collar illegality extends beyond simply pecuniary loss. Corruption of government officials can affect the quality of our food and the safety of our homes. Such illegality also has
invidious effect on the public’s perception of the integrity of our political, economic, social and
governmental institutions. Official corruption invariably involves breaches of trust, either in the
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A primary motivation behind the career offender guideline is the
desire to impose “especially long sentence[s] upon those who have committed prior offenses” in order to deter where prior punishments have
failed to.206 However, this preconception is not reflected in the reality of
the career offender guideline. First, there is a strong likelihood that an
offender with two prior convictions for low-level drug dealing will have
spent no time in prison before being labeled a career-offender.207 Upon
a third conviction, that individual will be assigned a Category VI criminal history and will likely face an enormous prison enhancement despite never having served any time in prison. In order to achieve the
desired deterrence effect, there must be “an appropriate relationship between the sentence for the current offense and the sentences . . . for the
prior offenses.”208 In the aforementioned scenario, the career offender
guideline is not serving its function because there has not been a real
attempt to deter the offender in the previous two convictions.
Another primary motivation behind the career offender guideline is to reduce recidivism.209 Yet, the data shows that drug offenders
do not recidivate with greater frequency than others, and in fact, recidivate less than other offenders who have criminal history categories of
VI.210 The Sentencing Commission itself has conceded that the career
offender guidelines “makes the criminal history category a less perfect

legal or moral sense, and such offenses generate in the public a deep sense of betrayal and disappointment. When an elected official accepts a bribe, a bank official abuses his position for
personal gain, a corporate officer engages in illicit activity, or an employed worker fraudulently
obtains unemployment insurance benefits, we as citizens feel cheated. Such public perceptions
are fertile ground for the development of widespread public cynicism and a conviction that the
entire economic and political system is corrupt and lacks integrity. It is precisely because whitecollar offenses have the capacity to subvert the basic assumptions of our institutions and drain
our national will that I consider white-collar illegality to be one of our most urgent law enforcement problems”)).
206
United States v. Mishoe, 241 F.3d 214, 220 (2d Cir. 2001).
207
See COMBINED SOURCEBOOKS, supra note 5.
208
Mishoe, 241 F.3d at 220.
209
Outlaw, supra note 50, at 60, 228.
210
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING: AN ASSESSMENT
OF HOW WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF
SENTENCING REFORM 134 (Nov. 2004), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/researchand-publications/research-projects-and-surveys/miscellaneous/15-yearstudy/15_year_study_full.pdf (“[T]he recidivism rates of drug trafficking offenders sentenced
under the career offender guideline based on prior drug convictions shows that their rates are
much lower than other offenders who are assigned to criminal history category VI. The overall
rate of recidivism for category VI offenders two years after release from prison is 55 percent.
The rate for offenders qualifying for the career criminal guideline based on one or more violent
offenses is about 52 percent. But the rate for offenders qualifying only on the basis of prior drug
offenses is only 27 percent”) (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted).
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measure of recidivism risk than it would be without the inclusion of offenders qualifying only because of prior drug offenses.”211
Overall, while an offender’s criminal history can help explain
the large disparity outlined in the previous section, it too involves implicit racial biases. The inclusion of drug offenses as a predicate felony
under the career offender guideline unfairly punishes minority groups
by overrepresenting a particular offender’s criminal history.212 The career offender guideline becomes further problematic when one considers that minority populations are more often subject to increased police
surveillance resulting in more arrests and convictions, as is the reality
in Baltimore, Maryland.213
C. Over-Policing of Baltimore City
Another explanation for the disparity in criminal history categories in the U.S. District of Maryland is Baltimore’s infamous over-policing problem. Baltimore City is an over-policed city.214 In 2016, the
Baltimore Police Department employed 41 officers for every 10,000
residents, which at the time was the fourth highest rate of any police
department in the country with over 500 officers.215 Most of the overpolicing, however, is concentrated in predominantly African American
neighborhoods.216
Following the death of Freddie Gray and the ensuing civil unrest
in Baltimore in April 2015, the Department of Justice launched an investigation into the practices of the Baltimore City Police Department
(“BPD”).217 In a 164-page report, the DOJ details its conclusions, finding that there is “reasonable cause to believe that BPD engages in a pattern or practice of conduct that violates the Constitution or federal
law.”218 Among the alleged practices was “using enforcement strategies
that produce severe and unjustified disparities in the rates of stops,
211

Id. (emphasis in original).
Outlaw, supra note 50, at 229.
213
See infra Part IV-C.
214
See infra note 218.
215
Scott Beyer, In Baltimore, Police Seem Everywhere and Nowhere at Once, GOVERNING
(Nov. 2018), https://www.governing.com/columns/urban-notebook/gov-baltimore-police-paradox.html.
216
See infra note 218.
217
Del Quentin Wilber & Kevin Rector, Justice Department report: Baltimore police routinely
violated civil rights, BALT. SUN (Aug. 9, 2016), https://www.baltimoresun.com/maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-ci-doj-report-20160809-story.html.
218
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., C.R. DIVISION, INVESTIGATION OF THE BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEP’T
3 (Aug 10, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/883296/download [hereinafter
INVESTIGATION OF THE BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEP’T].
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searches and arrests of African Americans[.]”219 Moreover, the concentration of these stops, searches, and arrests occur in “predominantly African-American neighborhoods.”220
The report also notes that BPD’s unabated targeting of African
American neighborhoods “disproportionately harms African-American
residents.”221 Because BPD stopped African American residents “three
times as often as white residents,” African Americans accounted for
86% of “all criminal offenses” despite comprising only 63% of the city’s
population.222 Furthermore, the report found that there were “large racial
disparities in BPD’s arrests for drug possession.”223 For instance, BPD
arrested African Americans for drug possession at five times the rate of
others, despite survey data showing that African Americans “use drugs
at rates similar to or slightly exceeding other population groups.”224
This “over-policing,” can result in an overrepresentation of the
over-policed group in criminal statistics. In Baltimore, the result is an
overrepresentation of African Americans in the criminal justice system
which produces deep distrust between law enforcement and the African
American community which thus exacerbates the problem.225 Over-policing can help explain why the Maryland criminal history statistics are
so severely skewed in showing an overrepresentation of minority
groups. African Americans are stopped, searched, and arrested more often, resulting in more convictions, with a particular emphasis on drugrelated crimes.
CONCLUSION
The motivation behind the enactment of the SRA and the promulgation of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines was a noble one.226 The need
to narrow sentencing disparities represents overarching principles of
219

Id.
Id. at 5. In one of the more jarring statistics in the report, it was revealed that although the
stops mostly occurred in African American neighborhoods, the neighborhoods encompassed a
relatively “small portion of Baltimore residents.” Thus, “hundreds of individuals—nearly all of
them African American—were stopped on at least 10 separate occasions” between 2010–2015,
and “seven African-American men were stopped more than 30 times during this period” (emphasis added). Id. at 6.
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See THE WEST BALTIMORE COMM’N ON POLICE MISCONDUCT AND THE NO BOUNDARIES
COALITION, OVER-POLICED YET UNDERSERVED 15 (Mar. 8, 2016), http://www.noboundariescoalition.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/No-Boundaries-Layout-Web-1.pdf.
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equality and justice that should be reflected in the United States criminal
justice system. However, since the passing of the SRA, sentencing disparities persist and have real implications for defendants all over the
country.227 In Maryland, drug offenders who are white receive greater
leniency in federal court in the form of departures and variances than
drug offenders who are non-white.228 This is a disconcerting realization
which needs to be addressed if the goal of the SRA and the Guidelines
is to be fully realized.
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See supra Part III-B.
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